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Payment Diversion & Business Email Compromise: Protecting Trade Payments in Cameroon

Fraudsters intercept supplier conversations and change bank details at the last minute. A practical control framework for importers, exporters and project teams.

PAGE International Editorial · Published · 3 min read

Some of the most damaging frauds in international trade do not involve a fake supplier at all. Criminals compromise or imitate a genuine email account, watch an invoice thread and then send “updated” bank details just before payment. The FBI describes business email compromise (BEC) as one of the most financially damaging online crimes, and its IC3 data shows the scheme reported across 177 countries. For businesses paying foreign suppliers from Cameroon—where transfers pass through several banks and time zones—the controls below are essential.

Key takeaways

  • Any change of bank details is a fraud signal until verified by phone.
  • Verify using a number you already hold, never one in the email.
  • Urgency and secrecy are the scammer’s main tools.

1. How payment-diversion fraud works

The FBI explains that criminals spoof addresses with slight variations (for example an added letter), send spear-phishing messages to obtain credentials, or use malware to read genuine invoice threads. With access to the conversation, they time their request perfectly: the supplier is “changing banks”, “under audit” or “unable to receive funds in the usual account”.

IC3 notes the scheme is not always about a wire transfer; variants request personal data, tax forms or cryptocurrency. In trade, the common outcome is a deposit or balance payment sent to an account the supplier does not control, often discovered only when the supplier chases payment weeks later.

Sources & further reading: [1][2]

2. Warning signs in trade correspondence

Watch for new bank details, especially in a different country from the supplier; a new or slightly altered email domain; pressure to pay before a deadline; requests to keep the change confidential; and an invoice that is otherwise identical to a previous one. A message arriving outside the supplier’s usual hours or in an unusual tone deserves a second look.

Fraudsters also impersonate internal executives, instructing finance staff to make an urgent payment. A director travelling or “in a meeting” and unreachable by phone is a classic setup.

  • Changed beneficiary or bank country.
  • Look-alike email domain.
  • Urgency, secrecy, unreachable sender.

Sources & further reading: [1]

3. Controls that stop most attempts

Adopt a written call-back rule: any new or changed bank details must be confirmed by telephone using a number already on file from the original contract or onboarding, never one supplied in the message requesting the change. Require two people to approve new beneficiaries. Hold a supplier master file with verified details and a record of who confirmed them and when.

Enable multi-factor authentication on email accounts, review mail forwarding rules regularly and train staff who handle payments. The FBI notes that many protective features of cloud email must be configured manually; check that they are switched on.

  • Call-back verification on a known number.
  • Dual approval for new beneficiaries.
  • MFA and forwarding-rule audits.

Sources & further reading: [1][2]

4. If you think a payment was diverted

Speed matters. Contact your bank immediately and ask it to contact the receiving bank to request a recall or freeze. The FBI advises victims to report to their financial institution at once; businesses with a US nexus can also file at ic3.gov. In Cameroon, also notify your bank’s fraud unit in writing and preserve all emails with full headers.

Inform the genuine supplier through a verified channel—their account may be compromised and other customers at risk. Reset passwords and check your own systems for intrusion.

Sources & further reading: [1]

5. How PAGE International handles payment details

PAGE International will never ask you to pay into a new account by email alone. If you receive any change of payment instructions in our name, call +237 675 531 242 or +237 698 021 474 before acting. This article is general guidance and does not replace advice from your bank or security adviser.

Sources & further reading

  1. [1] FBI — Business Email Compromise
  2. [2] FBI IC3 — Business Email Compromise: The $50 Billion Scam (June 2023)

Discuss your requirements

If you are unsure about a payment request in our name, call us on a published number before paying.

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